The Swiss National Bank surprisingly announced in January 2015 that it would no longer hold the Swiss franc at a fixed exchange rate of 1.2 Swiss francs per Euro, a peg it had defended for more than three years. The Swiss franc appreciated by approximately 15% immediately after the announcement. We exploit the removal of the currency peg to study how investors and firms respond to exogenous foreign currency shocks. We find large negative announcement returns for Swiss firms with significant foreign currency exposure. Affected firms experience a drop in profitability and react by reducing capital expenditures and moving production abroad.
"Today's Swiss National Bank action is a tsunami; for the export industry and for tourism, and finally for the entire country," Nick Hayek, CEO Swatch Group

Introduction
On January 15, 2015 the Swiss National Bank (SNB) announced that it would no longer hold the Swiss franc at a minimum exchange rate of 1.20 Swiss francs per Euro.
1 Immediately following the announcement, the Swiss franc appreciated strongly against the Euro and other currencies. After several days with high trading volume, the Swiss currency stabilized at approximately 1.02 Swiss francs per Euro, having appreciated by 15%. The above quote by Nick Hayek, CEO of watch manufacturer Swatch Group, reflects the widely held belief that the Swiss economy, with exports of goods and services making up over 50% of GDP, would be severely affected by the currency appreciation. After all, the threat a strong Swiss franc posed to Swiss competitiveness was the main reason why the SNB had introduced the peg in 2011. Commentators from the socialist party to the Swiss Business Federation echoed warnings that abandoning the peg might jeopardize profits and jobs.
In this paper, we study how investors and firms reacted to the sudden currency appreciation. We find that firms with large foreign currency risk exposure, which we define as Swiss firms that sell most of their goods and services abroad but have high production costs in Switzerland, experienced 5% lower announcement returns on January 15, 2015 than otherwise similar firms. We also show that during the six months following the currency shock, firms with large currency risk exposure experienced a drop in revenues, margins, and profitability and reacted by not only reducing capital expenditures, but also by shifting production abroad.
Our setting offers several unique advantages when compared to other studies that have examined investor and firm reactions to currency shocks. First, we analyze a significant appreciation of the currency of a developed country in an economically stable environment whereas most other studies typically study 1 Although the minimum exchange rate technically allowed for exchange rates higher than 1.20 francs per Euro, the constant appreciation pressure on the Swiss franc effectively turned it into a peg. During the three years of the minimum floor, the exchange rate never exceeded 1.25 francs per Euro. For the rest of the paper we will therefore use the terms peg and minimum exchange rate interchangeably.
currency depreciations that are preceded by economic turmoil. Second, the sudden repeal of the peg came as a surprise to most market participants. When the peg had officially been introduced on September 6 th , 2011, the SNB had argued that the strong appreciation of the Swiss franc was an "acute threat to the Swiss economy" and that it would be prepared to buy foreign currency in unlimited quantities to defend the peg of 1.20 Swiss francs per Euro "with the utmost determination". 2 Three years later and just weeks before the repeal, key representatives of the SNB still emphasized that the currency peg was and would remain a cornerstone of SNB policy. In a survey of 22 economists conducted by Bloomberg News in the week prior to the announcement of the repeal, not a single economist predicted the SNB to lift the peg anytime during the next year. 3 Third, firms' usage of currency derivatives to hedge against exchange rate changes might be of lesser concern in our study. As the Swiss franc had traded at 1.20 francs per Euro with almost zero volatility for more than three years (see Figure 1 ), firms might have substantially reduced their financial or operating hedging activities. While hedge ratios are not systematically reported, anecdotal evidence seems to confirm this conjecture. 4 We start our analysis by documenting the shareholder wealth effects of the currency shock. First, we show that Swiss publicly listed firms indeed lost a significant fraction of their market capitalization on the day the peg was abandoned. The one-day announcement return for the Swiss Market Index (SMI), which consists of the 20 largest Swiss firms, was approximately minus 8.7%, and more than 100 billion Swiss francs of shareholder wealth were lost in a single day across all Swiss publicly listed stocks. We then test the theoretical prediction that firms that sell most of their products abroad but have high domestic production costs have particularly high currency risk exposures (e.g., Shapiro, 1975; Adler and Dumas, 1984; Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston, 2002; Marston 1990; or Bartram, Brown, and Minton, 2010) . We identify exposed firms as companies that both generate a large fraction of their sales outside Switzerland and have a high ratio of Swiss fixed assets to total fixed assets. Indeed these firms experienced 5% lower announcement returns on January 15, 2015.
After the analysis of the stock market reaction we turn to the real effects of the exchange rate shock. We test the prediction that the franc's sudden and large appreciation reduces the competitiveness of export oriented Swiss firms as their domestic production costs in Switzerland increases compared to those of their competitors in export markets (see, e.g., Allayannis and Ihrig, 2001; Forbes, 2002; or Desai, Foley, and Forbes, 2008) . There may also be an indirect effect on Swiss firms that cater to the domestic market in that a decrease of import prices may have led customers to switch to foreign products (e.g., Campa and Goldberg, 1999 or Desai, Foley, and Forbes, 2008) . The relative importance of these two channels depends, above all, on the exposure of firms to the foreign market as well as on other aspects such as the industrial structure and the form of competition.
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We show that the exchange rate shock indeed had a strong effect on the profitability and competitiveness of firms that sell most of their products abroad but have their cost basis in Switzerland.
The sales of these treated firms decreased significantly more during the first half of 2015 than the sales of other Swiss companies that produce and sell in the same markets. The reduction in sales can, at least in part, be explained by an incomplete "pass-through" of the exchange rate shock to customers abroad. We find a significant negative marginal effect of the Swiss franc appreciation on the profit margins of Swiss 5 There is a large economics literature on how exchange-rate movements affect output prices. The literature includes the work on pass-through and pricing-to-market. Exchange rate pass-through is defined as the percentage change in local currency import prices resulting from a one percent change in the exchange rate between the exporting and importing countries. The term pricing-to-market has been coined by Krugman (1987) and describes the phenomenon of exchange rate induced price discrimination in international markets. The review article of Goldberg and Knetter (1997) summarizes the main findings of this literature as follows: Local currency prices of foreign products do not respond fully to exchange rates, i.e. there is incomplete pass-through. A price response equal to one-half the exchange rate change is typical for shipments to the U.S. A significant portion of the muted price response is driven by destination-specific changes in markups on exports. Increased reliance on foreign suppliers reduces the share of costs incurred in the home currency, which can further mute the pass-through relationship. Price discrimination in international markets requires market segmentation and market power.
exporters. This result suggests that the markups in export prices had been high prior to 2015 and that export prices did not have to adjust perfectly to the higher value of the Swiss franc (Allayanis and Ihrig, 2001 ). We also find that the drop in profit margins and sales had an effect on the overall profitability of treated firms. Swiss exporters experienced a significantly larger reduction of their return on assets than other Swiss firms.
Finally, we investigate how firms responded to the shock to their competitiveness and profitability. We find that treated firms reduced overall capital expenditures dramatically during the first half of 2015. At the same time, these firms used the stronger Swiss franc to shift production sites abroad via the acquisition of foreign firms and assets. Possible explanations include that Swiss firms want to benefit from operational hedges and cost advantages in cheaper countries or want to reduce pressure on their margins by buying European competitors.
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Our market-return based result of economically relevant currency exposures contributes to a large empirical literature that has attempted to infer exchange rate exposure from stock return data. The majority of these studies follow the methodology outlined in Adler and Dumas (1984) and measure exchange-rate exposure as the beta coefficient in a regression framework of stock returns on concurrent exchange rate changes. Somewhat surprisingly, these studies find that exchange rate movements explain a much lower proportion of the variation in stock returns than theory would predict. Jorion (1990) focuses on multinational firms and finds some evidence of economically small exchange rate exposure. He also shows that the level of foreign sales is the main determinant of exchange rate exposure. Bartov and Bodnar (1994) do not find a significant correlation between stock returns and concurrent exchange rates. Dominguez and Tesar (2006) examine a sample of international firms and find that exposure is correlated with firm size, multinational status, and foreign sales. Griffin and Stulz (2001) find that common shocks 6 There exists some evidence that exchange rates and operational hedging motives matter for cross-border acquisitions. Bartram, Burns, and Helwege (2013) examine cross-border acquisitions made by U.S. acquirers and find that the acquiring company often begins production abroad in a country where it already has substantial sales. Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) provide evidence that currency appreciations are positively correlated with crossborder M&A activity. Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) find that currency appreciations have significant positive correlations with foreign direct investment in the U.S., and that most U.S. targets operate in industries related to the industry of the foreign acquirer.
to an industry across countries are more important than exchange rate shocks that lead one country's industry to benefit at the expense of another country's industry.
According to Dewenter, Higgins, and Simin (2005) , this exchange rate "puzzle" might be due to several economic and econometric challenges in interpreting the results from stock return regressions.
Potential challenges include that the firms with the largest exposures might hedge, investors have difficulties assessing the currency exposure of firms, or that the signal to noise ratio in the stock market regressions is too low given the available data. Indeed, Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010) show that firms reduce their exchange rate exposure through operational hedges, FX derivatives, and FX debt. Dominguez and Tesar (2006) suggest that firms dynamically adjust their exposure. Bartov and Bodnar (1994) argue that the inclusion of firms with limited foreign activities, firms with exposures of opposite signs, or firms that can react to changes in international conditions at very low cost introduces noise into the analysis. The Swiss franc's sudden, large and unexpected appreciation helps overcome or at least alleviate most of these obstacles so that we are able to identify statistically and economically large currency risk exposures consistent with theoretical predictions.
We also contribute to the literature on the real effects of exchange rate fluctuations. Most of the existing evidence on firm-level reactions comes from currency devaluations. Aguiar (2005) documents that exporting Mexican firms outperformed non-exporting firms in both sales and profits in the year following the devaluation of the Peso in 1994. Forbes (2002) shows that firms with greater foreign sales exposure are more likely to have higher growth in sales, net income, market capitalization, and assets after depreciations. Unlike our study, both papers study currency depreciations in developing countries which are possibly confounded by negative macroeconomic conditions. The removal and introduction of fixed exchange rates has been found to impact stock price volatility (Bartov, Bodnar and Kalu, 1996; Bartram and Karolyi, 2006) .
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data, identify the firms with the highest exchange rate risk exposure, and offer summary statistics. In Section 3, we document the stock market reaction of Swiss firms to the announcement of the SNB on January 15, 2015.
In Finally we obtain information on merger and acquisition activity of sample firms from SDC Platinum. We require that the acquiring company is Swiss and retain all deals that are completed for the 7 Worldscope automatically converts values in foreign currency into Swiss franc for firms whose accounting statements are originally published in foreign currency. Still we drop these firms from the panel as the automatic currency conversion could introduce a mechanical effect on sales, cash flow, assets, and capital expenditure.
years before 2015. For deals announced in 2015 we also keep pending deals, which would otherwise be lost due to the delay between deal announcement and completion. 
Currency exposure
The following subsection elaborates how we define and measure the currency exposure of Swiss firms.
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In our empirical implementation, we use the following proxies to measure the currency risk exposure of Swiss firms. First, we follow Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010) and derive proxies for revenues and costs by geographical area. Under Swiss GAAP, firms listed on the Swiss stock exchange are required to report segment results on the same level as used by management to steer the company. The majority of Swiss firms report segment data by geographical segments. The typical Swiss firm reports revenues in Switzerland and revenues in other geographic areas. We use the fraction of foreign sales over total sales as a proxy for the export-dependency of Swiss firms. While Swiss firms do not report their costs of goods sold by geographic area, they typically break up their non-current identifiable assets by geographical area. We use, as do Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010) , the fraction of non-current identifiable assets in Switzerland as a proxy for the fraction of costs that are incurred in Switzerland. For our main tests, we define indicator variables equal to one if a firm has foreign to total sales or non-current identifiable Swiss assets to total non-current identifiable assets larger than the sample median, and zero otherwise. We interact the two indicator variables to establish a treatment group of firms most affected by the currency shock. We wish to however point out the limitations of our main currency exposure measure that is based on identifiable fixed assets. While it works well for the majority of the companies (see the example of Komax above), it can also be noisy. Consider, for example, the biopharmaceutical company Actelion
Ltd., which has 90% of its identifiable non-current assets in Switzerland. We classify the firm as incurring the majority of its costs in Switzerland. Actelion mentions in its annual report, however, that it incurred more than 70% of core operating expenses in foreign currency. Firms with a business model such as Actelion's which relies heavily on factors such as distribution and marketing have a larger disconnect between the location of their fixed assets and the location of their main operating expenses. Due to lack of better disclosure of costs by geographic region, we cannot construct a better proxy, and we would like to abstain from subjective case-by-case decisions. 11 It should be noted however, that the potentially noisy measurement of our main explanatory variable works against us, since attenuation bias induced by measurement error biases coefficient estimates towards zero. For full transparency, we list in Appendix B all sample firms with complete segment data and show the ratios of foreign to total sales and non-current identifiable Swiss assets to total non-current identifiable assets.
9 If either information on revenues or assets in Switzerland is missing, we exclude that firm from our analysis. The most common reason for missing information is that the firm does not report domestic revenues separately but pools Switzerland and the rest of Europe in one geographic segment. Some firms also do not report geographic segment data at all. 10 See press release at http://goo.gl/KZNIKF 11 Another potential issue is that Swiss firms may invoice their Swiss suppliers in Euros, as suggested by a recent report (available at http://www.procure.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Dokumente/PMI/pmi_de_1506.pdf).
As a second proxy for currency exposure we use an indicator variable equal to one if the number of geographical segments for which the firm reports revenues is larger than the number of geographical segments for which it reports fixed assets, and zero otherwise. The variable is designed to measure how well the company is hedged operationally. The variable has the advantage that it does not require breaking out Switzerland from the rest of Europe, and that it does not rely on reported values in CHF.
Finally, we implement the method of Jorion (1990) and estimate the Euro currency exposure of Swiss firms from stock market data. More precisely, we estimate the following time-series regression for
where is equal to the daily rate of return on firm i's common stock and is equal to the rate of change in the CHF/EUR exchange rate. 12 The exchange rate is measured in CHF so that a negative value for corresponds to a currency appreciation. Jorion (1990) also proposes the alternative specification , where denotes the daily rate of return on a stock market index. We prefer estimating the unadjusted currency beta because we want to measure a firm's total currency exposure, as recommended in Adler and Dumas (1984) . Yet, we find qualitatively similar results when estimating currency betas using the alternative specification that controls for the exposure of the firm to the domestic stock market. the currency beta for firms that were already listed in 2008. In addition, possible changes in firms' currency exposures between 2009 and 2014 will not be reflected in our exchange rate beta estimated before 2009. Such measurement error in the independent regressor should bias our results against finding evidence for a treatment effect. Table 2 We observe geographic segment data on foreign sales for 164 out of 208 sample firms. The average Swiss firm obtains 63% of its revenues from outside Switzerland, and the median Swiss firm obtains 85% of revenues from outside Switzerland. For 141 Swiss firms we observe fixed assets (or identifiable non-current assets) by geographic segment. The average (median) firm has 54% (52%) of its fixed assets in Switzerland. In the international sample of manufacturing firms in Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010) , the average firm reports foreign sales of 34.6% of total sales, and foreign assets average 19.2% of total assets. The average Swiss firm has therefore substantially more foreign exposure than the average manufacturing firm in Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010) , a fact that reflects Switzerland's status as a small, open economy. The numbers for foreign sales and fixed Swiss assets change very little once we condition on having complete segment data for both revenues and fixed assets. The largest deviation is that the median fraction of fixed assets in Switzerland changes from 0.52 to 0.45, meaning that firms which report complete segment data tend to be more international. In the empirical analysis, we use the median values of foreign to total sales and fixed Swiss assets over total fixed assets reported in Column 8 of Panel A to define the two indicator variables measuring currency exposure. We define a firm to have significant currency exposure if its value for foreign to total sales is larger than the median of 0.88, and if the ratio of its total Swiss to total fixed assets is larger than the median of 0.45.
Summary statistics
In the entire sample (first four columns of Panel A), 16% of the firms have a foreign market exposure of one and, therefore, report a higher number of geographic sales segments than segments with identifiable assets. The average and median currency betas are 1.33 and 1.15, respectively. The median absolute t-statistic of the currency beta is 7.06. These numbers illustrate the large exposure of the Swiss economy to the Eurozone. The average stock return on January 15, 2015 was minus 4.9%, and for the sample with complete segment data minus 6.2%. The average cumulative 3-day return from January 14 to January 16, 2015 is minus 9.5% for the overall sample, and minus 11.5% for the restricted sample. We define daily trading volume as the daily number of shares traded at the primary exchange of a given stock multiplied with the daily closing price. The daily trading volume is computed for each day of the previous calendar year and then averaged. Table 2 shows that the average daily trading volume in 2014 was about CHF 17.16 million. The average daily trading volume of firms with complete segment data is about 45 % higher than that of firms without this information, reflecting that larger firms are more likely to disclose full geographical information. The distribution of total assets is skewed because of the two large Swiss banks that have balance sheets of close to CHF 1 trillion. The average sample firm reports total assets of about CHF 23 billion, and the median sample firm has total assets of about CHF 1 billion. Once we condition on the availability of complete segment data, the median firm has total assets of CHF 1.49 billion. Hence, larger firms are more likely to report segment data. The average and median market to book ratios are 1.64 and 1.22, respectively, and change little in the restricted sample.
Columns 1 to 4 of Panel B show summary statistics for the panel data of 174 Swiss firms that report data on total assets, net cash flow, the market-to-book ratio, and industry code at least once between 2009 and 2015. The panel shows summary statistics for semi-annual observations. The mean and median foreign to total sales are 0.62 and 0.78, respectively. Swiss fixed to total fixed assets average 0.56.
The FX beta has a mean and median of 1.31 and 1.15, respectively. Table 2 also shows summary statistics for sales over total assets, return on assets, net profit margin, capital expenditures, total assets, cash flow, and the market-to-book ratio. With one Swiss franc of assets the average Swiss firm generates sales worth 0.42 Swiss francs over a period of six months. The average and median ROA are 2.6%, and 2.7%, respectively. The average net margin is about 2%. Total capital expenditures scaled by fixed assets average 9.6%, and the average firm reports a net cash flow of 3.2%. The market-to-book ratio is 1.50 on average. Table 2 On the day of the announcement of the peg, the SMI increased by 4.3%.
Panel B of
Panel C of
Stock market reaction to the introduction and removal of the CHF/EUR peg
The bottom panel shows the stock market reaction to the removal of the CHF/EUR peg. It is evident from the figure that the reactions both in the currency market as well as in the stock market were much more pronounced than at the introduction of the peg. The Swiss franc dropped from 1.20 CHF/EUR to below parity on January 15, 2015. The SMI lost 8.7% on January 15 and another 6% on January 16 for a total two-day drop of almost 1300 points or more than 14%. Hence, market participants believed that the Swiss economy would be severely affected by the strong Swiss franc. In untabulated analysis, we calculate the correlation between the one-day stock market returns of Swiss firms on September 6, 2011 and on January 15, 2015. The correlation is -0.32 and statistically significant at the 1% level. The result suggests that the firms that benefitted most from the introduction of the peg were also the ones most hit by its removal.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 seems to imply that the Swiss stock market had fully recovered from the unexpected currency appreciation shock two months later and that the shock may have only been temporary. Figure 2 shows, however, that this is not the case. In Figure 2 we display the evolution of the DAX, Germany's main stock market index comprised of the 30 largest German stocks, and compare it with the evolution of the SMI over the 8 months centered on the announcement of the removal of the currency peg. It is clear from Figure 2 that the shock to the Swiss stock market from the removal of the peg was large and persistent. While the German and Swiss stock markets move largely in parallel before 13 See the SNB's blog http://snbchf.com/chf/2014-chf/financial-crisis-snb-interventions/ the removal of the peg, the two indexes diverge sharply on the day of the announcement and stay apart for several months after the repeal of the peg. We now turn to a more formal analysis of the event returns and relate the raw January 15, 2015 announcement return to various measures of foreign currency exposure. We start by regressing announcement returns on the ratio of foreign to total sales. We also include several control variables such as firm size, trading volume, the market-to-book ratio, and industry dummies ( ):
The results are reported in Column 1 of Table 3 . The coefficient on Foreign sales is -0.041 and strongly significant. Firms that have a one-standard deviation (0.393) higher fraction of foreign sales exhibit a 1.6% lower announcement return. The economic magnitude is large: relative to the sample average announcement return of minus 4.9%, the return is more than 30% lower.
In Column 2 of Table 3 , we replace the fraction of foreign sales to total sales by the fraction of Swiss fixed assets to total fixed assets. Interestingly, the coefficient is positive. Firms that have more production facilities in Switzerland did relatively better than other Swiss firms on the day of the announcement. This is driven by the fact that firms with more production facilities in Switzerland have on average also more sales in Switzerland. The correlation between Swiss assets and foreign sales is -0.76. In
Column 3, we control for both foreign sales and fixed Swiss assets. The Foreign sales variable continues to be strongly negatively significant; its economic magnitude increases by more than fifty percent. In contrast, the fixed assets variable becomes indistinguishable from zero.
In Column 4 of Table 3 , we now estimate the main specification which identifies the treatment effect of the exchange rate shock on firms with both high foreign sales and high Swiss fixed assets. These firms ought to be most affected by the currency shock. To identify the treatment effect, we interact two indicator variables that are equal to one if a firm has above median foreign sales and above median Swiss fixed assets. The interaction term identifies the firms that have their cost basis in Switzerland, but receive their main revenues from abroad. We estimate:
where x>Q50, i denote indicator variables equal to one if the respective firm-level variable (e.g., fixed assets CH) exceeds the sample median, and zero otherwise. The coefficient of interest in this specification is , which measures the treatment effect, that is how the value of firms with the highest foreign currency exposure changes due to the exchange rate appreciation shock.
The coefficient estimate on the interaction term turns out to be negative, strongly significant, and economically large. The stock prices of firms that export a lot but produce in Switzerland fall by an additional 4.8% compared to other Swiss firms. The treatment effect of minus 4.8% is economically large, considering that the average stock price decrease on January 15, 2015 is 4.9%. The positive and significant coefficient of 0.033 on the Swiss fixed assets indicator variable shows that firms that had both Swiss assets and Swiss sales above the median did relatively well on the day the peg was abandoned.
In Column 5, we use the indicator variable Foreign mkt exposure, which equals one if the number of reported sales segments is larger than the number of reported asset segments as a simple measure of currency exposure. A positive value of the foreign market exposure indicates that the firm has more geographic sales markets than production markets, i.e. the firm has fewer operational hedges and is more exposed to currency shocks. Column 5 shows that those firms experience a significant negative treatment effect. Their stock prices fall by an additional 2% on the announcement date compared to other firms which benefit from a better operational hedge against the appreciation of the Swiss franc. Finally, Column 6 uses the CHF/EUR currency beta as a measure of exposure of Swiss firms. Note that this variable is available for the most comprehensive set of firms (171/208). We find that the higher the currency beta and thus a company's exposure to the CHF/EUR exchange rate, the lower are the stock returns on the announcement of the removal of the peg. A one standard deviation increase in the currency beta (0.964) is associated with a 2.12% lower announcement return. Relative to the average return of minus4.9% in the broader sample (see Table 2 , Panel A, Column 2), this corresponds to an almost 45% lower return.
Overall, the evidence across all six columns is robust and consistent with our hypothesis: Swiss firms that had more currency exposure did worse on the day of the repeal of the currency peg. Regarding the control variables, some specifications in Table 3 show that more liquid firms, as proxied by the average CHF trading volume in 2014, did more poorly on the announcement day. All other control variables have coefficients that are indistinguishable from zero.
In un-tabulated analyses, we also restrict our sample to non-financial firms. The absolute values of the regression coefficients for our different currency exposure measures decrease slightly in Table 3 but remain economically and statistically significant in all six specifications.
14 In Table 4 , we repeat our analysis with an extended event window of plus and minus one day, because Figure 1 suggested that the market also significantly adjusted downwards on January 16. All estimated coefficients increase substantially and retain or increase their statistical significance. For example, we learn from Column 4 of Table 4 that the coefficient of the indicator variable equal to one for firms that export a lot but produce in Switzerland is minus 7.7%. Thus, during the extended event window, the stock prices of treated firms dropped by an additional 7.7% relative to stock prices of control firms.
The corresponding coefficient in Table 3 was minus 4.8%. A one standard deviation increase in the currency beta (0.964) is now associated with a 3.6% lower announcement return. The only exception is the variable foreign market exposure, whose estimated coefficient remains somewhat constant but is not statistically significant anymore.
How did Swiss firms respond to the unexpected currency appreciation shock?
In its third SNB Quarterly Bulletin for the year 2015, the board of governors of the Swiss National Bank provides suggestive evidence that the currency appreciation might have triggered real effects for firms.
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For instance, data from national accounts show a decrease in capital investment of about 1% in the first quarter of 2015. In addition, exports of goods (services) declined by 8.6 (5.4) percent over the same period, suggesting that the unexpected appreciation had a substantial negative real impact on Swiss firms.
The bulletin also provides corroborating survey evidence showing that about 80% of the 182 firms that participated in the survey (both public and private firms) expected a somewhat negative impact from the exchange rate appreciation. Negatively affected survey firms responded that they took measures such as reductions in staff and reductions in investment in Switzerland as a response to the currency appreciation.
In this section, we investigate the real effects of the exchange rate shock on Swiss firms' competitiveness in a more systematic way. We first examine how sales responded to the shock. The evidence from the SNB Bulletin highlights substantially lower exports at the macro level, which suggests that we should find a decrease in sales at the micro level, too. We then analyze how profitability, measured by return on assets (ROA) and the net profit margin, was affected. Finally, we examine measures that managers could have taken after the appreciation of the Swiss franc to restore competitiveness. In particular, we examine real investment as measured by capital expenditures divided by fixed assets. According to the survey in the SNB Quarterly Bulletin of the third quarter 2015, firms 15 See http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/quartbul_2015_3_komplett/source/quartbul_2015_3_komplett.en.pdf. The SNB Quarterly Bulletin is published by the board of governors of the SNB and highlights monetary policy and other significant economic developments in Switzerland.
were also contemplating to move production abroad. Increased cross-border M&A activity after the appreciation would indeed be consistent with existing evidence in the literature (e.g., Erel, Liao, and Weisbach, 2012) . We analyze the fraction of mergers and acquisitions with foreign targets over total M&A activity in 2015 to examine whether Swiss firms take advantage of the stronger currency and buy targets abroad and to increase their operational hedges. Finally, firms could have decreased the number of employees in Switzerland. We offer some preliminary analysis on this important question; a more rigorous analysis can be carried out once firms will report employment numbers in their annual reports for 2015.
To analyze the effect of the exchange rate shock on sales over lagged total assets, ROA, net profit margin, and capital expenditures over total lagged fixed assets, we estimate the following specification using semi-annual data:
Fixed assets CH>Q50, it Foreign sales>Q50, it
Fixed assets CH>Q50, it
Foreign sales>Q50, it + Fixed assets CH>Q50, it 16 Note that we are using the sample medians for foreign sales and fixed Swiss assets in 2014 to define what currency exposure means. We use constant threshold instead of using year-by-year medians to keep our definition of what it means to be an exposed firm constant, and to use the same exposed firms as in the event return sample of Tables 4 and 5 . Having said this, the median of these two variables is quite stable in the time series, and using yearby-year medians to define the variable (and thus measure exposed firms relative to control firms in each year) leads to quantitatively and qualitatively similar results. Table 6 shows results for return on assets, which we measure as earnings before interest and taxes divided by lagged total assets. Column 1 shows that firms with a significant fraction of foreign sales had a significantly lower ROA in 2015. The effect is economically meaningful -a one standard deviation higher fraction of foreign sales (0.379) is associated with 0.65 percentage points lower ROA. Relative to the sample mean of 2.6%, the decrease corresponds to a 25% lower ROA. Column 4 shows the specification in which we estimate the coefficient from equation (4) above. The coefficient is economically large and statistically significant at the 5% level. Firms most exposed to the currency appreciation experienced a decrease in ROA of 5.2%. Column 5 shows that the coefficient of the variable Foreign mkt exposure is indistinguishable from zero. In Column 6, we measure currency exposure with the FX beta. The coefficient on the FX beta is -0.01 and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. A one standard deviation increase in the currency beta (0.867) corresponds to an almost 1 percentage point lower return on assets. Regarding the control variables, we find that larger firms and firms with higher market to book ratios have significantly higher ROA.
The currency appreciation shock should exert considerable pressure on profit margins of exportoriented firms. This is because firms might have responded by lowering the prices at which they sell their goods and services abroad to counteract the currency-induced price increase. While the evidence on ROA already points in this direction, we now look directly at the impact of the currency appreciation on net profit margin, which we define as net income before preferred dividends divided by net sales.
Column 4 of Table 7 shows that treated firms, i.e. firms with high foreign sales and high domestic fixed assets, experienced a dramatic reduction in margins. The coefficient on the triple interaction 2015 × fixed assets CH > Q50 × sales foreign > Q50 is -0.481 and significant at the 1 percent level. The coefficients on the other measures of foreign currency exposure have the expected sign but are not statistically significant.
We now turn to investigating how exposed firms reacted to the documented drop in revenues, profitability, and margins. First, we examine whether there was a reduction in real investment during the first half of 2015. Table 8 reports how Swiss firms changed their capital expenditures (standardized by lagged property, plant, and equipment) in 2015. We observe statistically and economically large effects for exposed firms. Column 4 of Table 8 shows that Swiss firms with large foreign sales and a Swiss cost basis had 11.3 percentage points lower real investment than otherwise similar firms in 2015. We find similarly strong effects when we measure currency exposure using foreign market exposure or the FX beta in Columns 5 and 6. The control variables in Table 8 have the expected signs: Smaller firms, firms with larger cash flows and more growth options have higher capital expenditures. Overall, the evidence of Table 8 shows that Swiss firms with significant currency exposure substantially reduced their capital expenditures, echoing the macro data from the SNB's Quarterly Bulletin.
Corporate takeovers and large asset acquisitions represent a second channel through which firms can quickly react to the Swiss franc appreciation. The stronger Swiss franc increases firms' ability to purchase foreign competitors through an increase in Swiss purchasing power abroad. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some Swiss firms did indeed follow this strategy.
17 Table 9 reports the results of a more rigorous regression analysis. Since the decision to engage in M&A activity is endogenous, we estimate a Heckman (1979) selection model. In the first stage we model the decision to become active in the M&A market (selection equation), and in the second stage the decision to acquire a foreign rather than a domestic target (outcome equation). The explanatory variables of the second stage regression are the same as those used in the investment regressions. In addition to the independent variables of the outcome equation, the first stage selection model includes four measures of leverage, profitability and availability of funds which have the potential to explain whether a firm undertakes an acquisition but which are plausibly exogenous to the choice of whether the target is a Swiss or a foreign firm. Table 9 presents two sets of results. Columns 1 and 2 show results without industry-and year-fixed effects. Columns 3 and 4 include them.
The first-stage results in Columns 1 and 3 indicate that larger firms as well as growth firms are more likely to engage in M&A activity, and confirm results from the earlier literature (e.g., Harford, 1999) . Leverage, cash flow or EBIT/assets do not have a significant impact on Swiss firms' decision to engage in M&A. The lambda estimate of 0.02 is statistically indistinguishable from 0, which alleviates concerns that unobservable variables are driving both the initial selection as well as the target choice.
Column 2 reports results for the second stage regression without industry-and year-fixed effects.
The dependent variable is an indicator variable which takes the value of one if the targeted firm is foreign, and zero otherwise. We find that the appreciation of the Swiss franc made foreign firms relatively more attractive takeover targets. Swiss firms with a high currency exposure (as proxied by high foreign sales and high Swiss fixed assets) were more likely to acquire foreign companies after the removal of the to obtain firm-specific employment numbers, we hope to establish a tighter link between treatment and employment.
Conclusion
The impact of sudden currency movements on firms poses an unresolved question in the corporate finance literature. Despite the large attention devoted to exchange rates by policy makers and economists, the empirical evidence on the issue is scarce, especially for developed countries. In this paper we exploit the surprise announcement by the Swiss National Bank to drop the Swiss franc's peg to the Euro as a laboratory setting. We provide direct evidence that the sudden and unexpected home currency appreciation had a predictable and significant impact on firms with large currency exposures. Firms with higher currency exposure experienced significantly larger negative announcement returns than other Swiss firms on the day the currency floor was removed. The result is robust across various measures of firms' exchange rate exposures.
We find that firms most affected by the home currency appreciation exhibit an economically significant reduction in sales, margins, and profitability. These firms with large currency exposure respond to the adverse currency shock by significantly reducing their capital expenditure and by moving production capacity abroad.
The Swiss economy features a large group of small and medium-sized enterprises which are world market leaders in the production of highly specialized machinery and equipment. Regrettably, those private firms do not disclose accounting information. Based on the nature of their business, we believe however that we would classify those firms to be in the group of firms with large currency exposures. Our study therefore has implications that go well beyond the treated publicly listed sample firms. Our results suggest significant negative consequences for the manufacturing sector in Switzerland.
Appendix A: Which Swiss firms are affected by the sudden appreciation of the Swiss franc?
We use the following stylized example to show which Swiss firms are most affected by the currency appreciation. For simplicity, we separate the universe of Swiss firms into four groups along two sorting variables: Revenues and costs. Firms can either have all revenues in Euro or all revenues in CHF, and they can have either all cost of production in Euros or all cost of production in CHF. The table analyzes what happens after a currency appreciation to revenues (R), costs (C), and profits (P).
Revenue in Switzerland
Revenue in Eurozone We make the simplifying assumptions that all four hypothetical Swiss firms denominate their balance sheet in CHF, cannot pass price increases on to their customers, and that none of these firms is affected by any indirect effects such as lower aggregate demand or higher competition from imports. The upper left bin of the table illustrates the situation of domestic players. Firms that produce and sell in Switzerland should not experience a direct effect after the currency appreciation. A good example from our sample is Swisscom AG, a provider of telecommunication and cable television services to Swiss residents.
Swisscom obtains some minor revenues from Italy (17.5%), but its main revenue and cost base is located in Switzerland (77% cost in CH, 82% revenues in CH). The top right bin covers exporters, the firms that are most affected by the currency appreciation. Those are the firms that produce in Switzerland and mainly sell their goods to the Eurozone. If they want to maintain the quantity sold, they have to adjust prices, with a direct effect on the profit margin. A good Swiss example would be watch manufacturer Swatch Group (72% cost in CH, 11% revenues in CH).
The bottom right bin shows a firm that has its headquarters in Switzerland, but conducts most of its business abroad. With both revenue and cost of production located abroad, these internationals have large operational hedges. Interestingly, they are also affected by the currency appreciation via a translation effect: Profits are constant in Euros but drop by 20% because of the CHF/EUR currency appreciation. Good examples from our sample for such multinational firms include Nestle (6% cost in CH, 2% revenues in CH), Roche Pharmaceuticals (16% cost in CH, 2% revenues in CH) or Logitech (2% cost in CH, 2% revenues in CH).
The bottom left bin corresponds to an importer headquartered in Switzerland that sells its products to the Swiss markets, but has all of its cost abroad. The firm would significantly benefit from a currency appreciation. There are relatively few of those importers in our sample, but an example that approximates this scenario would be battery producer Leclanche SA (4% cost in CH, 53% revenues in CH). Table 3 . Stock returns on the announcement day of the removal of the CHF/EUR currency peg
Appendix B: Foreign sales and Swiss fixed (non-current identifiable) assets of sample firms
The table shows results from six regressions of the raw January 15, 2015 announcement return to the removal of the CHF/EUR currency peg on variables measuring currency exposure and control variables. Columns 1 through 3 measure the currency exposure of Swiss firms by the ratio of sales from abroad over total sales and the ratio of Swiss fixed assets over total fixed assets. In Column 4, we create two indicator variables. The first indicator variable Fixed assets CH > Q50 is equal to one if the ratio of Swiss fixed assets over total fixed assets is larger than the sample median of 0.45, and zero otherwise. The second indicator variable Sales foreign > Q50 is equal to one if the ratio of foreign sales over total sales is larger than the sample median of 0.88, and zero otherwise. In Column 5, we measure currency exposure by an indicator variable which is equal to one if the firm reports more geographic sales segments than segments with identifiable assets, and zero otherwise. Column 6 reports results from a specification that employs the CHF/EUR currency beta estimated using daily return data between 2005 and 2008. All control variables are defined in Appendix C. The regressions include industry-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Table 4 . Cumulative stock returns on the announcement day of the removal of the CHF/EUR currency peg
The table shows results from six regressions of the cumulative raw return over the three days from January 14, 2015 to January 16, 2015 on variables measuring currency exposure and control variables. Columns 1 through 3 measure the currency exposure of Swiss firms by the ratio of sales from abroad over total sales and the ratio of Swiss fixed assets over total fixed assets. In Column 4, we create two indicator variables. The first indicator variable Fixed assets CH > Q50 is equal to one if the ratio of Swiss fixed assets over total fixed assets is larger than the sample median of 0.45, and zero otherwise. The second indicator variable Sales foreign > Q50 is equal to one if the ratio of foreign sales over total sales is larger than the sample median of 0.88, and zero otherwise. In Column 5, we measure currency exposure by an indicator variable which is equal to one if the firm reports more geographic sales segments than segments with identifiable assets, and zero otherwise. Column 6 reports results from a specification that employs the CHF/EUR currency beta estimated using daily return data between 2005 and 2008. All control variables are defined in Appendix C. The regressions include industry-fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) Columns 1 through 3 measure the currency exposure of Swiss firms by the ratio of sales from abroad over total sales and the ratio of Swiss fixed assets to total fixed assets. In Column 4, we create two indicator variables. The first indicator variable Fixed assets CH > Q50 is equal to one if the ratio of Swiss fixed assets to total fixed assets is larger than the sample median in 2015, and zero otherwise. The second indicator variable Sales foreign > Q50 is equal to one if the ratio of foreign sales to total sales is larger than the sample median in 2015, and zero otherwise. In Column 5, we measure currency exposure using an indicator variable which is equal to one if the firm reports more geographic sales segments than segments with identifiable assets, and zero otherwise. Column 6 reports results using the CHF/EUR currency beta estimated using daily data between 2005 and 2008. All control variables are defined in Appendix C. The regressions include industry-fixed and half year-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses, and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Columns 1 through 3 measure the currency exposure of Swiss firms by the fraction of sales from abroad to total sales and the ratio of Swiss fixed assets to total fixed assets. In Column 4, we create two indicator variables. The first indicator variable Fixed assets CH > Q50 is equal to one if the ratio of Swiss fixed assets to total fixed assets is larger than the sample median in 2015, and zero otherwise. The second indicator variable Sales foreign > Q50 is equal to one if the fraction ratio of foreign sales to total sales is larger than the sample median in 2015, and zero otherwise. In Column 5, we measure currency exposure by an indicator variable which is equal to one if the firm reports more geographic sales segments than segments with identifiable assets, and zero otherwise. Column 6 reports results using the CHF/EUR currency beta estimated using daily data between 2005 and 2008. All control variables are defined in Appendix C. The regressions include industry-fixed and half year-fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firmlevel are reported in parentheses, and ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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